By Gordon Hahn, January 20, 2026
Several astute observers of international relations, diplomacy, Russian-Western relations, and the NATO-Russia Ukrainian War — for example, the perspicacious Alexander Mercouris – are arguing that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s January 15th speech during his acceptance of credentials of new ambassadors to Moscow signalled a new hard line. The new line was in these observers’ view evident in Putin’s insistence that the West engage Russia in talks on a new security architecture for Europe. I, for one, am unable to see in this speech anything representing a new hard line. Rather, I see any manifestation of a possible new hard line in the escalation of Russia’s air war against Ukraine, but even here I doubt the significance of any Kremlin intensification of its war effort and its connection with recent Ukrainian- Western escalations.
The ‘new hard line’ version is that it is Moscow’s response to the attempted drone assassination of Putin at his Valdai residence, where some sources claim he was not located at the time when Kiev launched some 91 drones in the direction of the residence, as well as to the US-UK-Ukrainian war on tankers carrying Russian oil and the New Year’s Eve Ukrainian attack on a hotel in Khorly, Kherson region that killed some 25 civilians (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/01/new-year-drone-strike-kills-24-in-russian-occupied-ukraine-moscow-says). It is further claimed that Putin was holed up in consultations for the first decade of January to develop a new hard line and response to these attacks.
In regard to the alleged December 28th Putin assassination attempt, it is unlikely that the Kremin can discern whether US President Donlad Trump was a willing participant or a CIA dupe in the plot to fix Putin in place after their phone call prior to the former’s meeting with Ukrainian leader Volodomyr Zelenskiy. In this telling, Trump called Putin prior to the Zelenskiy meeting and asked Putin to remain in place so he could get back to him on the results of the meeting. In this way, Putin stayed in place as the drones were directed at Valdai during the Trump-Zelenskiy meeting. In my view, it is more likely that if indeed Putin was at Valdai and Trump ‘fixed’ him to that locality, then this was a machination executed by CIA Director John Radcliffe, Secretary Marco Rubio, and perhaps other administration officials in order to entrap Trump in the plot in order to scuttle US-Russian relations. Such a scuttling, incidentally, could have been expected to be the result whether or not Putin was assassinated, not assassinated but at Valdai, or not at Valdai. Either way, Trump can be seen as having participated in a plot to assassinate Putin, especially by the more Americanophobic Russian officials, and Putin must now have major doubts about trusting his American counterpart. So, to be sure, the assassination episode is certainly a reason for the Kremlin to harden its line. However, it needs to be remembered that despite these dark possibilities, the Kremlin is prepared to receive Trump’s chief negotiator Steven Whitkoff and Jared Kushner. Thus, the new hard line could be much harder.
It should also be kept in mind that the tanker war against Russian oil exports was peaking in late December leading up to Putin’s New Year’s hiatus in early January. So this is also a driver of the new hard line, the hardeness of which should not be exaggerated.
Putin’s January 15th speech reveals no change in attitude towards the Americans or President Trump. Neither is even mentioned. In fact, rather than being some watershed declaration of a new hard line, Putin’s speech was nothing more than standard Putin boilerplate assertions. The relevant passage – coming after Putin reminded the new ambassadors of the importance of the UN Charter — reads:
“…(S)ecurity must be truly comprehensive, and therefore equal and indivisible, and it cannot be ensured for some at the expense of the security of others. This principle is fixed in the fundamental international legal documents.
“Neglecting this basic, vital principle has never led to anything good and will never lead to anything good. This was clearly demonstrated by the crisis around Ukraine, which was a direct result of years of ignoring Russia’s just interests and a deliberate policy of creating threats to our security, moving the NATO bloc towards the Russian borders – contrary to the public promises given to us.
“I want to emphasize this: contrary to the public promises made to us. Let me remind you that Russia has repeatedly taken initiatives to build a new, reliable and fair architecture of European and global security. We offered options and rational solutions that could suit everyone in America, Europe, Asia, and all over the world.
“We believe that it would be worthwhile to return to their substantive discussion in order to consolidate the conditions on which a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Ukraine can be achieved – and the sooner the better.
Our country is striving precisely for a long-term and sustainable peace that reliably ensures the security of everyone. Not everywhere, including in Kiev and the capitals that support it, are they ready for this. But we hope that awareness of this need will come sooner or later. In the meantime, Russia will continue to consistently achieve its goals. At the same time, I would like to emphasize once again and ask you to take into account in your activities that Russia is always open to building equal and mutually beneficial relations with all international partners for the sake of universal prosperity, well-being and development” (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/79011).
There is nothing in this statement that Putin has not said numerous times. In a sense, it is a recount of recent history, alluding implicity to Moscow’s 2008 and 2021 offers to Washington to negotiate a new security architecture for the West and Russia.
Moreover, the Kremlin has been pursuing a rapprochement with the U.S ever since the new Trump administration broached the idea at the outset. The US-Russia track has not included a larger Western-Russian security architecture discussion because of Europe’s unwillingness to engage Russia, other than through continued war waged by an increasingly ruined Ukraine. The US-Russia track has discussed NATO expansion as well as diplomatic restoration, potential trade, the Arctic, and presumably nuclear arms issues, with New START set to expire in weeks. So there is nothing new in Putin’s proposals for negotiating a new security infrastructure for
Russia and the West, the lack of which – along with the Western-backed Maidan
putsch and NATO’s de facto expansion into Ukraine — was seen by Moscow as
necessitating its special military operation into Ukraine.
Now, if there is an escalation, then it is to be found on the battlefield rather than in rhetoric in accordance with Putin’s standard operating approach. Unlike those in Washington, Brussels, and Kiev, who are overly focused on the effect on narratives and the power of words to create new ‘realities’, Putin is singularly focused on the details of conducting an effective, surgical, and politically safe special military operation.
If there really is an extraordinary Russian escalation tied to the West’ and Ukraine’s escalations in December, then it can be seen in the intensification of Russia’a special military operation is evident in the second (and perhaps impending third) use of the dreaded Oreshnik missile and the increasingly massive war on Ukraine’s electricity infrastructure, which is blacking out Ukraine’s major cities and provoking mass evacuations from those cities, most notably Kiev itself. This will help cripple Ukraine’s drone warfare capacity that has hit Russia’s oil facilities and oil-carrying tankers and was deployed in the apparent ‘Putin assassination’ attempt or provocation.
But even here it is difficult to discern a major uptick in Moscow’s air war against Ukraine or its electricity infrastructure. The Oreshnik has already been used last summer; now it has been used again. The incapacitation of Ukraine’s electrical grid has been a gradual process lasting over a year, with the cumulative effect reaching
a critical mass just now.
In sum, I do not see an inordinate, major escalation or new hard line emanating from Moscow. Rather, I see a continuation of Putin’s sufficiently methodical, precisely targeted, and well thought out strategy for destroying the Ukrainian army, its war fighting capacity, and the configuration of the current Maidan regime that persists in rejecting accommodation with Moscow at the West’s behest.